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Federal Sovereign Immunity and
CERCLA: When is the United States
Liable for Costs?
HOLLY EVERETT*
In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' to respond to the
problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste
disposal sites.' Provisions for financing the cleanup of these sites
were also included in this statute. Essentially, CERCLA places
the financial responsibility for cleanup on those parties responsible
for the hazardous waste site.3 In 1986 CERCLA was reauthorized
and amended to include the Hazardous Substance Superfund.'
This fund finances the federal government's response to hazardous
waste. Additionally, Congress directed the federal government to
use Superfund money for response actions and to recover all re-
sponse costs from all parties responsible for the waste site.6
A problem arises, though, when the United States is itself a
responsible party. Sovereign immunity may prohibit an action
against the United States. Indeed, the United States may not be
sued without its consent.' Consent is given when the United States
explicitly waives sovereign immunity.7 The Supreme Court has
said waivers of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally ex-
* Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCEs & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
J.D., University of Kentucky, Class of 1994; B.A., University of Louisville, 1990.
CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
See HR. REP No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
a United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989).
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
SARAI.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
6 United Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d 1320, 1325 (6th Cir. 1993).
7 Id.
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pressed" in the statutory text, construed in favor of the United
States, and not enlarged beyond the language of the statute.'
Courts construing the waivers of sovereign immunity found in
CERCLA have reached conflicting decisions. One court has rea-
soned that CERCLA's remedial purpose leads to an expansive
reading of its provisions in order to avoid frustrating the legisla-
tive purpose." However, all courts do not follow this rationale.
Thus, interpretations of the same section often result in different
conclusions. This note will examine several recent cases in light of
the judiciary's interpretations of CERCLA waivers.
I. STATE ACTIONS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Sovereign immunity may be waived under CERCLA section
120. In United States v. Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources,'" a court considered whether a state can order
the federal government to clean up a federal facility. The Pennsyl-
vania Department of Environmental Resource (DER) tested soil
located on the Navy Ships Parts Control Center and found con-
tamination by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Subsequently,
the state issued to the Navy Control Center a cleanup order which
cited a waiver of sovereign immunity under CERCLA as author-
ity." Specifically, Pennsylvania relied on section 120(a)(4) of
CERCLA which states:
State laws concerning removal and remedial action, including
State laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and
remedial action at facilities owned or operated by a department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States .... The pre-
ceding sentence shall not apply to the extent a State law would
apply any standard or requirement to such facilities which is
more stringent than the standards and requirements applicable
to facilities which are not owned or operated by any such de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality."2
8 United States v. Idaho, 113 S.Ct. 1893, 1896 (1993).
0 See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992).
O United States v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Natural Resources, 778 F.Supp. 1328
(M.D. Pa. 1991).
1 Id. at 1330. Pennsylvania relied on the following state laws: Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law, 35 PA. CONs. STAT. §§ 691.3. 691.301. 691.307, 691,401 (Purden 1977 &
Supp. 1991-92) and Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act, 35 PA, CoNs. STAT.
§§ 6018.301. 6018.302, 6018501. 6018.601 (Purden Pamphlet 1991-92).
" CERCLA § 120(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
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The United States challenged Pennsylvania's exercise of power
under this section.
The United States argued section 120(a)(4) waives sovereign
immunity only for state laws that are similar in purpose to CER-
CLA.'" In effect these state laws would require specific, predeter-
mined standards for cleanup of waste. The United States based
this argument on the phrase "removal and remedial action" which
it said should be construed in a technical sense." According to the
United States, Pennsylvania was proceeding under general envi-
ronmental laws because they permit ad hoc judgments about the
cleanup and the standards to be applied."5 Furthermore, the
United States asserted the laws were inconsistent with CERCLA's
goal of comprehensive cleanup of waste sites because the state
laws were limited to only one kind of pollution.16 Hence, the
United States claimed it had not waived sovereign immunity for
these state laws.
Pennsylvania argued that the United States had read the
phrase "removal and remedial action" too narrowly. It pointed to
the CERCLA definitions of remove, removal, and remedial action
which are very broad. 17 The state also noted that section 101(24)
includes enforcement activities within the meaning of removal and




I7 Id. The definition of remove and removal is found in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) which
states:
The terms "remove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be neces-
sary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into
the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal
of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary
to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or
to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release.
CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C § 9601(23) (1988).
The definition of remedial action is found in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) which states:
The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent
with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in
the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the
environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
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remedial action. Thus the state argued the laws provided for these
actions because they allow the DER to order polluters to clean up
sites within the state. 8
The court agreed with Pennsylvania and held section
120(a)(4) waived sovereign immunity. It found Congress must
have known of the broad definitions for removal and remedial ac-
tion when it chose the phrase "state laws concerning removal and
remedial action." 19 Accordingly, Congress could not have meant
to restrict the application of the section to state laws which con-
tain predetermined, objective, and precise standards for deciding
when violations occur under state law. To do this, Congress would
have included language to that effect in section 120(a)(4).2 ° Thus,
the court held that CERCLA section 120(a)(4) waives sovereign
immunity."
Recently, however, the First Circuit rejected a state's attempt
to recover civil damages from the United States under CERCLA
section 120. In State of Maine v. Department of Navy,2 Maine
filed an action which claimed the United States Navy's shipyard
in Kittery, Maine had not complied with Maine's hazardous waste
laws.23 The Navy responded to this action by agreeing to comply
with state regulations. However, the Navy refused to pay the
punitive fines imposed by state law for past noncompliance by
claiming sovereign immunity. 4
Like Pennsylvania, Maine argued section 120 waived sover-
eign immunity. The court of appeals, though, rejected this argu-
ment. The court noted CERCLA uses language different from
RCRA, but held that the reasoning in United States Department
of Energy v. Ohio was still dispositive.'I
According to the court, section 120 does not waive sovereign
immunity because: (1) the language is unclear, and (2) the legis-
lative history of CERCLA offers nothing with which to distin-
, Dep't of Natural Resources, 778 F. Supp. at 1331.
19 Id. at 1332.
20 Id.
Id.
22 State of Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992).
23 Id. at 1009.
2' Id.
2I Id. at 1010-11. In United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct. 1627 (1992),
the Court held Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for civil fines imposed by a state
for past violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").
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guish Department of Energy.26 Language waiving sovereign im-
munity must be "clear and unequivocal.""7 The language in
CERCLA failed to meet this test because it could refer to pro-
spective coercive fines, retrospective civil penalties, or both.28 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court's observation regarding section 6961
of RCRA applied to Maine's argument. In Department of Energy
the court said:
[Tihe statute makes no mention of any mechanism for penaliz-
ing past violations, and this absence of any example of punitive
fines is powerful evidence that congress had no intent to subject
the United States to an enforcement mechanism that could de-
plete the federal fisc regardless of a responsible officer's willing-
ness and capacity to comply in the future.
29
The court of appeals also rejected Maine's effort to use the legis-
lative history of CERCLA to argue legislators believed section
120 waived sovereign immunity. To do this, Maine relied on com-
ments in a conference report.30 These comments were not helpful
to the court because they referred to both section 120 of CER-
CLA and section 6001 of RCRA, did not describe how CERCLA
could or would differ from RCRA, and provided no mechanism
for distinguishing Department of Energy." Therefore, the court
stated Department of Energy required it to hold that section 120
does not provide a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign im-
munity from civil penalties.
31
II. PRIVATE PARTY ACTION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
A. EPA Regulatory Activity
Private parties have had mixed results in holding the federal
government liable. For instance, in United States v. Western
Processing Co.33 the court found EPA regulatory activity will not
subject the United States to liability. RSR Corp. filed a counter-
2" Department of Navy, 973 F.2d at 1011.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 td. (referring to Department of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1640).
SO Department of Navy, 973 F.2d at 1011 (referring to HR. CONF. REP. No. 962,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
31 [d.
32 Id.
11 United States v. Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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claim seeking contribution from the United States based on the
Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory activity at the
Western Processing Site. 4
RSR argued section 107(d)(1) waived sovereign immunity.
Section 107(d)(l) provides:
[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), no person shall be liable
under this subchapter for costs or damages as a result of actions
taken or omitted in the course of rendering care, assistance, or
advice in accordance with the National Contingency Plan
("NCP") or at the direction of an on-scene coordinator ap-
pointed under such plan, with respect to an incident creating a
danger to public health or welfare or the environment as a result
of any releases of a hazardous substance or the threat thereof.
This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages-
as the result of negligence on the part of such person.
5
RSR argued the United States is a person and is liable for negli-
gence. As a result, the EPA should be subject to a separate suit
for negligence.3 6
The United States asserted it had not waived sovereign im-
munity under section 120(a). This section states "each depart-
ment, agency, and instrumentality of the United States . . . shall
be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner
and to the same extent ... as any nongovernmental entity, includ-
ing liability under section 9607 of this title."137 Pursuant to section
120(a), government agencies which act as owners, operators, gen-
erators, or transporters will be expected to bear their share of
CERCLA response costs."' The United States argued, however,
that Congress did not intend to make EPA cleanup and regulatory
activities grounds for contribution claims. Doing so would provide
for a new defense whenever the United States initiated a cleanup
action.3 9
First, the United States claimed it would violate the funda-
mental principle that "those who benefit financially from a com-
mercial activity [should] internalize the health and environmental
" Id. at 727.
Id. at 729 (referring to CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988)).
Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 729.
f Id. at 728 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 9620).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 729.
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costs of that activity into the costs of doing business."4 Second,
CERCLA calls for strict liability subject only to specific, enumer-
ated defenses. Third, Congress rejected an amendment that would
have created a defense for government misconduct and negli-
gence. 1 Fourth, the last sentence in section 107(d) merely ex-
plains CERCLA has not occupied the field to the exclusion of tort
claims. 2 Furthermore, the United States argued interpreting sec-
tion 120(a) to waive sovereign immunity when the EPA carries
out its duties would be inconsistent with the strict construction in
favor of the United States on sovereign immunity issues.
4 3
The court found the EPA does not become a liable owner or
operator when it carries out its duties. It agreed with the United
States that Congress intended for potentially responsible parties to
assume costs of cleanup as part of the cost of business." Making
the EPA liable would "muddle the rationale underlying the statu-
tory scheme."4 In carrying out its duties, the court said the EPA
is not behaving like a federal agency which generates its own
waste and transports it to the site. 6 Moreover, the court agreed
that the last sentence in section 107 is more meaningful as a state-
ment on preemption.4 7 Accordingly, the court found CERCLA
does not waive sovereign immunity for contribution claims based
on EPA regulatory activities.
4 8
40 Id.
1 Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 729.
42 Id.
,3 Id. at 728.
44 Id. at 729.
45 Id.
" Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 729.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 729-30; see also United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chem., Inc., 797 F.
Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1992). In Atlas Minerals, the E.P.A. began an initial clean-up opera-
tion of a hazardous waste site owned by the defendant. After expending over $1 million
dollars, they halted the clean-up activity and brought suit for recovery of those initial ex-
penses and to force the defendant to finish the job. The defendant counter-claimed against
the E.P.A. because their negligent cleaning efforts actually intensified the environmental
damage for which Atlas was liable, allegedly by $15 million dollars.
Citing Western Processing, the court stated that challenges to EP.A. response and
remedial actions were barred. The court further stated that section 120(a) only applies as a
waiver when the government acts as a private party in creating the waste,
1993-941
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B. Government as Operator
As Western Processing noted sovereign immunity is waived
when the government is an owner or operator. In FMC Corp. v.
United States Department of Commerce,49 the court considered
when the United States meets the test for being an owner or oper-
ator. FMC owned and operated a facility in Virginia from 1963 to
1976.50 FMC sought indemnification from the United States for
some portion of its cost of removal and response.5'
Its claim against the United States was based on the opera-
tion of a rayon manufacturing facility at the site by the War Pro-
duction Board from 1942 to 1945.52 FMC said the United States
was liable as an owner, operator, or arranger under section 107 of
CERCLA.55
The court made the following findings of fact: (1) the chair-
man of the War Production Board characterized rayon cord pro-
duction as "one of the most critical in the entire production pro-
gram;" 54 (2) the facility, then owned by American Viscose Corp.,
was required by the United States to produce one-third of the
cord needed by the nation; (3) the War Production Board ordered
American Viscose to convert and expand the facility to produce
more high tenacity rayon each year;55 (4) the Board set the pro-
duction levels which were in effect until revoked by the Board;"
(5) the United States leased equipment and machinery to the fa-
cility and arranged and oversaw the design and installation of gov-
ernment equipment at the facility;57 (6) the United States di-
rected army officers and others to report to the plant to ensure an
49 FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp., 471 (E.D. Pa.
1992) aftid, 10 F.3d 987 (1993), and reh'g granted, No. 92-1945, 1994 WL 52831 (3rd
Cir. Feb. 23, 1994).
50 Id. at 472. The site had been on the National Priority List since 1986.
51 Id.
52 Id. During World War II, the United States suffered a loss of its crude rubber
supply. In order to manufacture tires and other war items, the United States needed a
rubber substitute. The best substitute was high tenacity rayon tire cord which was pro-
duced at the Virginia facility. FMC presented evidence that the United States managed
and controlled the facility during World War II and owned facilities and equipment at the
plant. The manufacturing process involved the treatment of hazardous materials, and dis-
posal of the materials necessarily followed.
83 Id.
64 FMC Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 475.
55 Id. at 476-77.
56 Id. at 477.
51 Id. at 478.
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adequate work force for production;56 (7) while United States per-
sonnel were at the facility, a large amount of highly visible waste
disposal activity took place; 59 and (8) the United States knew or
should have known the disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-
stances was inherent in the manufacture of rayon. 0 Based on
these findings and others, the court concluded the United States
was an operator within the meaning of section 107(a)(2), hazard-
ous waste was disposed of while the United States was an opera-
tor, and a release or threatened release occurred at the facility
within the meaning of section 107(a)(4)."' The United States,
therefore, was jointly and severally liable for costs incurred by
FMC.
62
Other district courts, however, have ruled sovereign immunity
applies only to facilities currently owned by the United States. In
Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.,3 the court considered
whether the United States Air Force could be held liable for con-
tamination of a site it owned and operated from 1951 to 1954.
The United States argued section 120(a)(4) does not waive sover-
eign immunity for sites previously owned by the United States.64
To interpret the statute the court first looked at the language
in section 120(a)(4). 65 It found that the first sentence was ambig-
uous, but that the second sentence helped to decide the issue. 6
The court said:
[T]he second sentence expressly distinguishes federal facilities
with "facilities which are not owned or operated by any such
department, agency, or instrumentality." In other words, the
comparison is casted in the present tense, suggesting that the
reference to "facilities owned or operated by the United States"
in the first sentence should be construed in the present tense as
well." 7
The legislative history does not indicate Congress intended to per-
mit the United States to be sued regardless of whether it currently
Id. at 480.
" FMC Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 484.
60 Id. at 485.
I' Id. at 486.
I d.at 486-87.
Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
, Id. at 227.
I Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988)).
6 Id. at 228.
6 Id. (alteration in original).
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owns or operates the facility."8 Moreover, the language throughout
section 120 referring to federal facilities is cast in the present
tense.69 Therefore, the court held the United States cannot be
sued unless it is the current operator.7
0
C. Recovering Attorney Fees
Courts have been divided on whether private parties can re-
cover attorney fees. A district court recently considered this issue
in light of the split in the circuits.7 In Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,72 C & P asked for at-
torney's fees and costs of litigation as necessary "response costs"
under CERCLA.73 Before the court could consider the question of
sovereign immunity, it had to decide if parties could recover attor-
ney fees and costs.
One defendant, Pocket Money Recycling Company, Inc., ar-
gued C & P could not recover these costs and fees because they
are not provided for in CERCLA. 4 C & P relied on section
101(25) to argue otherwise. Section 101(25) says: "The terms 're-
spond' or 'response' means (sic) remove, removal, remedy, and re-
medial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and
'remedial action') include enforcement activities related
thereto. ' 75 C & P thus argued the cost of response that may be
recovered by a private party and the costs of removal and reme-
dial action that may be recovered by the United States both in-
clude the costs of enforcement activities.76 Pocket Money con-
68 Id.
OI ld.
Id.; see also Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army, 801 F. Supp. 1432
(M.D. Pa. 1992). But see Tenaya Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. United States Forest Service,
No. CV-F-92-5375 REC (E.D. Cal. May 18, 1993).
71 Two judicial circuits have reached different results. Compare General Elec. v. Lit-
ton Indus. Automation Sys. Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th cir. 1990) (allowing recovery of attor-
ney fees) with Stanton Road Assoc. v. Lohrey Enter., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) (cit-
ing the "American Rule" denying recovery of attorney fees unless Congress explicitly
authorizes courts to award such fees).
11 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 826 F. Supp. 961 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
13 Id. at 962.
" Id. Pocket Money relied on the "American Rule" under which a party cannot re-
cover attorneys' fees unless they are provided for by contract or statute, id.




tended that a potentially responsible private party cannot perform
enforcement activities as the government would.
77
The court found that CERCLA does allow a private party to
perform enforcement activities because section 107(a)(4)(b) al-
lows "'any . . . person' other than 'the United States Government
or a State or an Indian tribe' to recover 'costs of re-
sponse. . .. , ,,71 As noted in section 101(25), costs of response
includes costs of enforcement activities.7 9 According to the court,
Congress would have restricted enforcement activities to the gov-
ernment through the definitions if it did not intend for private par-
ties to perform enforcement activities. 0 In addition to the clear
language in CERCLA, the court relied on the purpose of CER-
CLA. The remedial purpose of CERCLA calls upon private par-
ties to participate in cleanup and recovery actions. The court said:
[P]rivate parties which initiate cleanup of contaminated sites
and sue their confederates in pollution for contribution, 'enforce'
the statute under any reasonable construction of that term....
To deny private parties the benefit of the language in CERCLA
entitling them to fees and costs expended to draw other polluters
into cleanup efforts would create an economic disincentive for
responsible parties to take the very action which CERCLA
plainly seeks to encourage."'
CERCLA expressly states private parties can recover costs of en-
forcement activities in response cost actions.
Having disposed of this issue, the court then turned to
whether language in CERCLA waives sovereign immunity for
fees and costs. The court noted it did not need to look to other
sources because the language in CERCLA is clear.8 It relied on
section 120(a)(1) which says:
[E]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chap-
ter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedur-




Id. at 964; see also General Electric v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys. Inc., 920
F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a private party recovery action can be an
enforcement activity within the meaning of the statute).
" Chesapeake, 826 F. Supp. at 965.
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ally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including
liability under 9607 of this title.83
The court concluded the government was held liable to the same
extent as nongovernmental entities under section 107.84 Accord-
ingly, private parties can recover attorney fees and litigation costs
against the United States.
CONCLUSION
Conflicting decisions regarding waivers of sovereign immunity
leave litigants in a state of flux. Interpretations of section 120, for
example, have sent different messages to the states.8 5 The result
will be more fighting over which jurisdiction should pay and how
much. In a time of scarce resources, the federal and state govern-
ment will obviously endeavor to hold onto their money.
States and private parties should take note of the requirement
that the government be an owner or operator to incur liability.
EPA regulatory activity apparently will not give rise to a cause of
action based on government ownership or operation. Counter-
claims naming the EPA, therefore, will not be successful." More-
over, litigants may not be able to sue the United States unless it is
the current owner or operator. On the other hand, private parties
can benefit greatly with the ability to recover attorney fees. Given
the cost of litigation, however, the United States could be
stretched thin financially.
Each of these cases reveals the importance of careful statu-
tory construction. What seems clear to one court often is not clear
to another. Furthermore, the legislative history has not been very
helpful to courts construing CERCLA. Congress should provide
legislative history for CERCLA that is not mixed with other envi-
ronmental statutes. Because a waiver of sovereign immunity can
mean the depletion of federal resources, it is important for Con-
gress to clarify the extent of the waivers in CERCLA. The
reauthorization of CERCLA this year provides an opportunity to
do that.
Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1988)).
id.
'5 See supra part I discussing state actions against the federal government.
66 See supra note 48 discussing the holding in United States v. Atlas Minerals &
Chem., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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